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THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STrUy. By Ernst Rabel. Volume
Two. Foreign Corporations; Tort; Contracts in General. Ann Arbor, Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School. Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1947. Pp. xli,
705. $8.00.
SomE day a legal historian will write the history of thought in the conflict
of laws in this country since its earliest days in the nineteenth century. It will
be a fascinating study, particularly when perspective has become greater and
the influence of recent personalities has become less. Lorenzen has already
given us a start,' but the full treatment can hardly yet be done.
Of course Story dominated the early days, and set many of the early pat-
terns. More than fifty years ago Beale entered the field. He was a doughty
protagonist, prodigious in effort and productive writing. He clearly felt the
need of system and certainty in the field. He produced the system, taught it,
expounded it, and sought through it to establish some element of certainty.
In some ways his zeal was almost theological. Things simply could not be any
way other than according to his system.
It was natural that such an approach should lead to opposition, and in due
course it developed. This is not the place to discuss these views in detail. Pro-
fessor Lorenzen, with the benefit of a background in comparative law, Was
one who spoke out. But the most vigorous assailant over a period of some
twenty years was Professor Cook. It was perhaps fortunate for legal scholar-
ship that Beale and Cook were both such vigorous personalities. It would
have been more fortunate if they could have been more tolerant and under-
standing of each other. Cook wrote many articles to show that Beale's theories
were not inevitably correct. Yet, their approaches were so different that the
two men might as well have been working in different fields as far as their
effect on each other was concerned.
In 1940, I was chairman of the Committee on Publication of the faculty of
the Harvard Law School. At that time I proposed to Professor Cook that we
should publish the book which he had long said that he Wanted to put out in
the conflicts field, of which his articles were planned as chapters. It was my
thought that this would be a contribution to legal scholarship, and that it
might serve in some way as a friendly gesture between what had come to be
known as the "Harvard" point of view and the iconoclastic approach. As a
contribution to legal scholarship the resulting book2 has been worthwhile. As
a step towards harmony it was not a success.3
1. Lorenzen, Story's Commentaries ot the Conflict of Law--One Hundred Years
After, 48 Ha. v. L. REv. 15 (1934).
2. CooK, THE LOGICAL Am LE.AL BASES OF Tm CounIcr oF LAws (1942).
3. Professor Cook did not even acknowledge in the preface to the book the part which
the Harvard Law School played in making it possible to publish the book.
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When the manuscript came in, we made no suggestions for any changes in
it. However, I did write to Professor Cook a general commentary on his
point of view and approach. In brief, my suggestion was that his arguments
were largely negative and destructive, that he showed that Professor Beale's
conclusions were not inevitable, but that he did little to show what solutions
should be reached in particular cases. The result of this letter was a new chap-
ter for the book, entitled "In Conclusion." In this chapter, my letter to Pro-
fessor Cook was quoted, but without mentioning my name, and a rathet sum-
mary attempt was made to answer what I had said-all of which seemed to
me to be largely confession, and a very little bit of avoidance. Although the
book was then in pages, we immediately sent the new concluding chapter to
the printer. After it was in type, we received a telegram from Professor Cook
telling us not to print it. So we took it out, and it does not appear in the book.
But within a few months after the book appeared, Professor Cook published
the chapter, under the title "An Unpublished Chapter"--in two different le-
gal publications. 4
*All of this is perhaps-an unpardonably long and irrelevant beginning for a
review of the second volume of the great work in the conflict of laws which
has come to us from Ernst Rabel, with the support of the University of
Michigan Law School, and under the general editorship of Professor Hessel
E. Yntema. I prepared a brief review of the first volume,0 in which I pointed
out the remarkable background which Mr. Rabel brought to the work. The
present volume fully measures up to the promise of the ifirst. When the entire
series is completed, we will have virtually a new treatise in the conflicts field,
plus a treatment of comparative conflict of laws such as has never before been
available in English.
The excuse for the introductory part of this review is that it seems to me
that Rabel here has gone far to bridge the gap which was so deeply cut be-
tween Beale and Cook and their respective supporters. This is not done con-
sciously. Although both authors are cited, there is no direct effort to set out
their views, and evaluate or reconcile them. Instead, Mr. Rabel simply goes
ahead and writes his views about various conflict of laws problems. But his
knowledge of all the writings is so great, and ,his experience in comparative
law is so unique, that what he has done often seems to be a synthesis of all or
many views, and the reader often finds himself surprised at the harmony that
is reached. Mr. Rabel writes without a trace of irritation or rancor, indeed
almost without argumentation. But he writes well, and most persuasively
about many points.
There is no general discussion in this volume, similar to the first hundred
pages in the first volume, which I have found to be one of the most stimtilat-
ing pieces of writing in the conflicts field. The present volume is confined to
4. 37 ILL. L. REV. 418 (1943), and 21 CAN. BAR REv. 249 (1943).
5. 7 FED. BAR J. 211 (1946).
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three topics, as indicated by the title: corporations, torts and contracts. It
would be interesting to take up and discuss various points in these chapters.
It seems best, however, to confine my observations to the contracts chapter
which is the best example of what I have in mind.
Professor Beale argued that the parties to a contract could not choose the
law to govern it. They could not set themselves up as a legislature, he said.
This view was expressed in articles, incorporated into his treatise and written
into the Restatement. The other view has been taken with equal vigor. Some-
how, these discussions have all seemed inconclusive, and contracts has re-
mained one of the almost completely uncertain and confused fields in con-
flicts. Mr. Rabel's chapters are a breath of fresh air. He engages in no con-
troversy, although he recognizes the various views. He simply develops the
subject in such a way that it seems entirely clear that the intention of the
parties should be recognized, within certain limits, which he discusses, too.
Then he continues with an excellent chapter on "Rules in Absence of Party
Agreement," which strikes me as the best thing available in English on the
topic.
The book is not encyclopedic. It does not undertake to cite all the cases.
(Indeed, it may be that the scholarly book which cites all the cases on a sub-
ject is now nearly past.) There is a very good selection among the cases, and
these are woven into a discussion and analysis of the problems which is re-
markable for its clarity and persuasiveness. In some parts of the book it is
not clear that the comparative approach has contributed much, except as a
novel bringing together of materials from other countries. But in the contracts
chapters we have the real fruits of the comprehensive nature of Rabel's
knowledge of the rules in many countries under different legal systems. This
is comparative legal scholarship at its best.
There is probably no one in the world who is better qualified to do this sort
of task than Mr. RabeL Although the great part of his life was spent under
the civil law, he shows that he has a clear grasp of common law principles and
the common law approach. He has written a fine book, which should have a
salutary influence on American conflict of laws. We are much indebted to
him, and to the University of Michigan Law School which has made his work
possible in this country.
ERwiN N. Gswowmj
- Dean and Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
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FREED oM AND THE ADmINSTRATIVE STATE. By Joseph Rosenfarb. New
York: Harper and Brothers, 1948. Pp. 274. $4.00.
FoR more than a decade the literature on public affairs has been heavily
sprinkled with works of varying dimensions devoted to the issue of govern-
mental intervention in the economic sphere. Most of the writers align them-
selves on one side or the other of this controversial question because it is not
a subject which readily lends itself to dispassionate analysis. Mr. Rosenfarb
has not broken precedent in this book. To him the case for the administrative
state-his name for the government which exercises full control over the na-
tional economy-is beyond the realm of controversy. Not only is it good, it is
inevitable, unavoidable. By drawing heavily upon the writings of a wide
range of historians, anthropologists, philosophers, sociologists, psychologists
-the enumeration is not complete-the author develops his argument.
In his quest for power man has passed through successive stages of politi-
cal evolution to the present pattern of politico-economic organization. Civili-
zation has advanced because division of labor has made possible the increase
in productive power which is synonymous with economic progress, But divi-
sion of labor produces only chaos unless a central coordinating instrument
can synchronize divergent efforts toward a meaningful end. The hope that
some impersonal mechanism such as the free market could perform this cru-
cial function has not been realized because human institutions have not per-
mitted the free market to exist.
It remains for the state to assume this responsibility. Mr. Rosenfarb be-
lieves that the Federal Government must assume the task of planning our en-
tire economy. By this he means quantitative determination of specific produc-
tion goals. In his own words:
In wartime the government decided how many tanks, planes, and
guns it needed and distributed the orders to private industry to fill
under its supervision. . . .The same can be done in peacetime. We
can ascertain the needs of the country in terms of housing, clothing,
food, automobiles, refrigerators, electric appliances, etc. We can
also take inventory of our natural resources, foreign imports, and
industrial plants. We should be in a position to make accurate esti-
mates of the desirable yearly production in each industry. The gov-
ernment would then assign a quota of production to each producer
in the industry to fill, guaranteeing him against loss if he failed to
sell the product.'
There is a note of the implacable, the fatalistic, in Mr. Rosenfarb's attitude
toward the administrative state. "Though we cannot avoid the triumph of the




can bring them to unprecedented fruition in the administrative state."' 2 "If
government intervention in our economy were not indigenous to our dviliza-
tion, its tempo of development would not have been increased by the war-
the classic accelerator of historical processes."3 "We shall now consider
whether the administrative state controlling an economy of active planning,
whose evolution is inevitable, can be a free and democratic state. The answer
cannot affect the existence or nonexistence of an economy of planning, which
is inevitable." 4 This theme is reiterated throughout the book.Y
The author goes to great pains to point out that freedom-both economic
and political-will not be jeopardized under the planning of the administra-
tive state. We are assured that the government can produce full employment
without imposing uniform standards upon production and consumption.
"Uniformity is not part of economic planning. Planning for diversity is im-
plicit in our great industrial capacity." "Not only freedom of the consumer
but the liberty of the entrepreneur will be enhanced in the democratic admin-
istrative state. There will be price and wage regulations, to be sure, but these
will be the conditions and not the limitations of freedom of enterprise."7 And
again, "Economic planning is not incompatible with freedom of employment.
To workers as well as to employers a planned economy will bring ex-panded
economic freedom of larger opportunities for making economic choices. ' S
Mr. Rosenfarb is vague concerning the nature and degree of controls that
he has in mind. He indicates that the decisions which determined where and
how the individual employee would work would be made in "over-all eco-
nomic decisions" in which the interests of labor, management, and the con-
sumer would be represented. "Liberty implies choice, and choice involves a
voice in the making of decision. This is implicit in the democratic character
of the administrative state."9
These are heartening words, but what do they mean? When the author ob-
serves that "assignment of production quotas should serve as a challenge and
not a constraint on business opportunities for there would be no compulsion
to engage in business," there is reason to ask whether "free enterprise" has
not fallen victim to semantic license. Until the control mechanism through
which business decisions will be permitted to operate is set forth more ex-
plicitly than occurs anywhere in the book, such optimistic judgments as the
ones herein expressed must be accepted with reservation. It is on the level of
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and unless this problem is solved, successful governmental integration of the
economy is illusory. What the author has in mind is so vaguely stated that it
is impossible to give serious consideration to this proposal.
Although his administrative organization is largely undefined and wholly
undeveloped, the author puts great faith in the efficacy of boards. I-Ie proposes
a Public Requirements Board to ascertain total needs, a Resources Inventory
Board to keep an inventory of our resources and plan their use and conserva-
tion, a Production Planning Board to do the over-all planning and supervision
of production, a board to administer price control, and a board to integrate
the wage-price relationship.'0 To these boards on the economic front he
would add a Board of Dissemination of Information to insure adequate in-
formation for all."
He explains his preference for the board form on the ground that "since
these agencies would determine public policy, the board system is preferable
to the single administrator, in order to afford a forum for differences of opin-
ion."' 2 This comment when coupled with his observations on administrative
organization of the Federal Government' 8-where he does not mention these
boards and how they are to fit into the administrative structure which he
recommends-leaves one with the suspicion that his organizational thinking
has not kept pace with his conception of desirable goals.
Mr. Rosenfarb makes his greatest contribution in his section on labor in the
administrative state. Here he is on ground where he has not only a reading
familiarity with his subject matter but brings to his discussion the kind of
penetrating insight that comes from continuous personal contact. He writes
with a sureness of touch that carries conviction not present in other sections.
His argument has a cutting edge because it is specific and concrete, He dis-
cusses the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Act trenchantly and makes his
points clearly. Even where one disagrees it is necessary to respect the au-
thor's judgments, because he has solid reasons for his views.
Labor's expanding consciousness, its growing political importance are ac-
cepted as inevitable and healthy. The alternative modes of political self-ex-
pression are discussed. In the light of events during the past decade, the
author examines the case for and against the use of the labor union as an in-
strument of both economic and political action. Should the union through it$
leaders attempt to commit its memberi to political decisions? Mr. Rosenfarb
thinks not. He believes the individual member should be free to make his
own political choices, because confusion of economic issues and political ques-
tions is likely to decrease the effectiveness of union leadership. It seems open







economic state the author visualizes, but he gives cogent reasons for his con-
clusions.
Mr. Rosenfarb has written an optimistic book. His faith in the ability of
American administrative and organizational talent to synchronize our almost
limitless productive capacity with consuming needs is stimulating, even though
not entirely convincing. Perhaps he has a sweep and penetration of vision
which illuminates the shadows and apparent gaps in his argument. To this
reader these dark spots mar the placid beauty of a panorama sketched in such
broad strokes. One can find little objectionable in the kind of world the book
envisions. A planned economy which will remove all the defects of laissez-
faire capitalism without sacrificing individual and group freedom is a pleas-
ant prospect for anyone except a confirmed misanthrope. As a goal toward
which during the next hundred years America may move haltingly and pain-
fully, Mr. Rosenfarb's book is a useful contribution. As a blue print or build-
ing plan for the step-by-step progress toward that goal, it leaves something to
be desired.
One can only hope that the author will devote his next work to a detailed
analysis of the organizational and procedural problems of his administrative
state.
LAWRENCE H. CHAmBnL Xtiux
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF BusixNSS ORGANIZATIONS (COR-
PORATIONS). By Adolf A. Berle and William C. Warren. Brooklyn: The
Foundation Press, 1948. Pp. xix, 1344. $8.50.
IN 1930 Berle liberated corporation finance from thraldom to the tradi-
tional corporations course by publishing CASES AND MATERIALS IN THE LAWv
OF CORPORATION FINANCE. Yet-fhe and Varren tell us in their new case-
book-the need for reunion ("integration") was apparent "from the begin-
ning." Their new book presents "as a single course of study the basic data
of both the conventional corporate field and of corporation finance." It should
be no surprise that the colony, having thrived in independence, is the domi-
nant partner in the new union.
While the new volume, which seems to me to be the best in the field, is in
no sense merely a revised edition of Berle (1930), or of Berle and Magill
(194:2), the 1942 volume is the central core of the present work: Part II
("Capital Stock and Its Property Or Contract Rights"), Part III ("Public
Issue of Stock"), and Part IV ("Funded Debt") embrace much of the old
book. There are important changes, however, both by way of welcome ab-
breviation (the unexciting state Blue Sky materials have been cut to a single
'I Associate Professor of Government, Columbia University.
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case and a few pages of text) and of addition (e.g., cases on the elimination
of preferred dividends arrearages). The materials on increases in stock and
preemptive rights have been trimmed and re-arranged. The authors recog-
nize the importance of an introduction to corporate accounting, and have in-
cluded some useful materials on this subject, which represent an improve-
ment over the earlier volume.
The major departures from the 1942 volume, of course, are the new sec-
tions, representing perhaps half the present work, which carry out the au-
thors' purpose of integrating the conventional corporate field with corpora-
tion finance. (While the authors do not suggest the time to be devoted to the
course, it hardly seems possible to do justice to the materials in less than two
semesters of three hours each.) The "integration" takes the form of Part I
("Creation of the Corporation"), Part V ("Management and Operation"),
Part VI ("Stockholders' Remedies for Mismanagement") and Part VII
("Sale, Merger, Consolidation and Dissolution").
Part I is something of a catch-all, in which the authors offer a set of incor-
poration papers as exhibit A and then deal briefly but suggestively with the
ultra vires doctrine and with pre-incorporators. They then take up modifica,
tion of the corporate "contract" by the state and by the directors and stock-
holders in what strikes me as the weakest part of the book. The authors rec-
ognize that amendments to state corporation laws are often drafted if not
dictated by self-serving interests to effectuate what can be called state policy
only in a Pickwickian sense. The "state" may be lending its aid to the ma-
jority's board of directors as against the minority stockholders; the constric-
tion of stockholders' suits by Section 61-b of the New York General Corpora-
tion law shows that Delaware is not the only haven for refugees from fidu-
ciary duties. Can a way be found to curb state legislatures which are acting
perversely without redelivering them into bondage to the due process clause?
Is Stone's famous footnote' in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U. S. 144, applicable here? Berle and Warren hardly suggest the depth of the
issue. Finally, Part I offers a selection of cases on the de facto doctrine and
on disregard of the corporate fiction.
Parts V, VI and VII seem to treat adequately their respective problems.
The fiduciary obligation of corporate managers is not dealt with until Part V
(p. 921). As a consequence of this unconventional postponement, the Stu-
dent should come to the subject able to appreciate clearly the financial effects
of the activities which are challenged by minority groups. On the other hand,
the fiduciary principle will already have been encountered briefly in connection
with the valuation of property, the declaration of dividends, and the rights of
preferred shareholders.
The book is limited to the corporate device for assembling and investing




capital, to the exclusion of individual proprietorships and unincorporated
groups. The "functional approach" called for by Douglas almost twenty
years ago2 is echoed in the titles "business units," "business associations," and
"business organization." While Frey, Dodd and Baker, and Berle and War-
ren use the generic trademark, only Frey applies it; Dodd and Baker, like
Berle and Warren, add the specific label "corporations" and it is this qualifi-
cation which correctly brands their works. And, indeed, perhaps there is only
illusory promise in a comparison, for example, of the capital contributions
of individuals and partners with the public issue of securities by corporations,
or of the partner's right to an account with the stockholder's right to informa-
tion. It may be that Steffen's Cases on Agency, with its fruitful juxtaposi-
tion of unincorporated and incorporated enterprise with respect to limited
liability and the scope of managerial authority, has made the comparison at
the most useful points.
Yet even while restricting their range to the corporation, Berle and Warren
could have related their structure more effectively to the life-history of busi-
ness enterprise. The "assembling of funds"--promotion-is split by the au-
thors into four enclaves: the relation of pre-incorporators to each other and
the corporation's liability on pre-incorporation agreements (66-92) ; the non-
public issue of stock (230-381) ; the public issue of stock (731-850) ; and the
fiduciary duties of promoters (929-958). The purpose of this organization
(though it can be corrected in part by skipping from one place to another) is
not easily grasped, especially in a book whose keynote is "integration." True,
the promoter is a "fiduciary," as are the director and the dominant stock-
holder, with whom he is grouped. But if an amorphous label for a diversity
of remedies is to govern pedagogy, the law of business management could be
turned over to the course in Trusts. Surely, the authority of the "pre-incor-
porator" to bind the corporation, the common law restrictions on "pro-
moter's" profits, the state Blue Sky laws, and the Securities Act of 1933 bear
equally on the "assembling of funds" and can best be approached as aspects
of a single process. In this connection, the neglect of investment banking
(which was treated in Berle, 1930) is regrettable. Without knowledge of the
process of marketing securities, the student will not grasp the significance of
the Security Act's 20-day waiting period or of the way in which pre-emptive
rights hinder access to the public money market. A distressing failure to con-
trast statutory with common law remedies characterizes the section on the pur-
chase of stock by corporate managers; the SEC's pregnant Rule X-10B-5 is ig-
nored and Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act is quoted but with-
out comment or citation of authority. Moreover, the treatment of the SEC's
control of proxy solicitation is quite inadequate. These shortcomings are espe-
cially surprising in the light of Berle's early single-handed explorations in
these very fields.
The inclusion of funded debt-which sets off the present work, like its
2. A Functional Approach to the Law of Business Associations, 23 ItI.. L REv. 673
(1929).
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predecessors, from other casebooks-is a great advantage; as is recognized,
the legal distinctions between preferred stockholder and bondholder do not
correspond to financial reality. Yet the cases on the elimination of preferred
dividends arrearages are not balanced by even a glimpse of the impact of re-
organization on the rights of bondholders. Moreover, the treatment of
funded debt might well have led into a consideration of still other means of
raising funds, such as equipment trusts, chattel mortgages and conditional
sales, term loans, and inventory and accounts receivable financing. Some
mention of these devices seems essential not only to supplement the brief
treatment of the after-acquired property, income, and negative pledge clauses
of corporate indentures, but also because they may serve as substitutes for the
flotation of funded obligations.
Berle and Warren tell us in their Foreword that the modern corporation has
changed from "a vehicle for profit-making investment" into "a social institu-
tion, wielding enormous power, responsible in great part for providing em-
ployment, developing technique and resources, supplying necessary goods and
services, influencing community development, gravely affecting the lives of
great numbers of people, and appreciably influencing sociological and political
evolution." This gives rise to their prophecy that "the great legal battles in
corporation law in the next generation" will probably be fought in the socio-
logical rather than in the financial arena. Yet despite this stirring conception
of corporate law, and despite the authors' assertion that "no apology" is re-
quired for including comments relevant to these issues, the book's funda-
mental orientation is toward the financial frontiers along which Berle was so
prescient a pioneer. Indeed, a quotation from Burnham's discredited Man-
ageriai Revolution, excerpts from the 1932 Dodd-Berle exchange4 on the
breadth of corporate managers' responsibility, and a recent proposal for "re-
sponsible capitalism" by John Fischer seem to be the principal materials for
which the authors feel it necessary not to apologize.
Though in this respect-as in some others-the authors' reach exceeds their
grasp, the gap reflects both the richness of their aims and the poverty of cur-
rent thought about the corporation. Their book is superior in breadth, sug-
gestiveness and vigor, and should serve, as they hoped, to bring together cor-
poration finance and the traditional corporations course into a fruitful union.5
BORIs I. BiTTKxRt
3. Pp. 499, 899.
4. Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trusteest, 45 HARV. L. REv. 1145
(1932) and Berle, For Whom Corporate Managerr Are Trustees. A Note, id. at 1365.
5. It is therefore especially a pity that the publishers have done so atrocious a job of
bookmaking: the paper is too thin, the type is set too tightly, and there is an unconscionable
amount of fine print. (There arrived in the mails as I completed this review a well-printed
brochure from the publishers, announcing that "we, once again, are able to do the type of
work which has long distinguished us as a leader in the improvement of the physical fea-
tures'of casebooks." One can only hope that Berte and Warren is classed as a war-time,
not.as a peace-time, product.)
t Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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EcoNoMIc POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT: PENNSYLVANiA, 1776-1860.
By Louis Hartz. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948. Pp. 320.
$4.00.
THE author of this volume, an assistant professor of government at Har-
vard, has produced an effective example of the synthesizing of materials and
techniques from several different disciplines. He has developed his thesis by
calmly and profitably invading the preserves of the sociologist, the economist,
the political scientist, the lawyer, and the historian, without even a self-con-
scious nod at any "Keep off the Grass" signs. To be sure he is dealing with
a problem offering enough different facets to invite representatives of all the
social sciences to take a close look. But he approaches it alone and with an
obvious sense of obligation to achieve an effective synthesis. This he has
done with success.
The investigation is the second in a series of four Studies in Economic
History, prepared under the direction of the Committee on Research in Eco-
nomic History of the Social Science Research Council. It follows the volume
on Massachusetts by Oscar and Mary Handlin published in 1947.1 Similar
studies focusing on Georgia and Illinois are scheduled to appear later. All
four projects seek an understanding of the relationship between government
and economic life in the pre-Civil War period, both the relationship as it ex-
isted in fact and the relationship as it appeared in theory.
Pennsylvania seems the ideal subject for such an inquiry. Here, at the be-
ginning of the period, stood a state already rich in business experience, with
a colonial heritage of shipping activity, of merchant venturing in the west, of
developed urban life. Here, too, political theorists like Franklin and Wilson
had aired their judgments and opinions. The social conscience was strong,
goaded by the Quaker influence. Immigration problems and the presence of
non-English stock were far more familiar to the Pennsylvanian of 1787 than
to his brother in Massachusetts. And in the years which passed between the
war of 1776 and the war of 1860, the Keystone State continued to present
within its borders examples of every important phase of economic, social, po-
litical, and intellectual life identified with the country as a whole.
Professor Hartz has made the most of the opportunities thus presented to
him. He has concerned himself with transportation, from the turnpike and
canal programs to the rise of the Pennsylvania Railroad system; with every
phase of banking; .with labor problems and labor legislation; with the long
history of the corporation and the theories of control which that history
stimulated; with the making of statutes and the operation of courts; with sec-
tionalism within the boundaries of the state; with political parties and their
changing alignments.
An example of sound analysis, in considering the state as promoter and
1. Reviewed in 57 YAi.L L. J. 333 (1947).
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entrepreneur, emerges from the section on public works. The author con-
cludes that the state's attitude toward the principle of public ownership had
advanced through four well-defined stages between 1785 and 1835: "(1) The
period immediately after the Revolution in which the state assumed complete
responsibility for the construction and operation of turnpikes. (2) The period
from 1791 to 1825 when the state began to rely increasingly upon private and
mixed corporations and when complete public ownership was challenged on
practical grounds. During this period public ownership was universally ac-
knowledged, as before, as being within the legitimate sphere of state action.
(a) The period of the initiation of the public works system when public
ownership was not only accepted as legitimate but was believed by the over-
whelming mass of Pennsylvanians to be practical and desirable as well. (4)
The period after 1830 when, in controversies over the use of the public rail-
ways, the legitimacy of ownership as a governmental function began to be
challenged for the first time, and in a vague way."2
From the well-organized segments of material the major thesis gradually
evolves: that democratic thought in Pennsylvania between 1776 and 1860 was
anything but "laissez-faire" in its conception of the proper relationship be-
tween government and economic life; that, on the contrary, it held to a broad
doctrine of state economic action. The oft expressed opinion that Govern-
ment intervention in economic life, so important in the post-Civil War era,
succeeded an earlier period of "laissez-faire" suffers a severe blow as a result
of this study. The Federal Government's increasing role in the economic
sphere, after 1865, would appear to follow not an age of "laissez-faire" but
instead an age of vigorous state activity. The shift was not from non-inter-
vention to intervention but rather from the strong arm of the state govern-
ment to the strong arm of federal authority.
Thus the chief contribution of the study is to attach the label "myth" to the
supposed freedom of American economic life from political interference,
prior to 1860. "In face of the evidence," Hartz declares, "it would be hard
to contend that the objectives of economic policy cherished by the state from
the Revolution to the Civil War were either limited or unimportant. They
ramified into virtually every phase of business activity, were the constant pre-
occupation of politicians and entrepreneurs, and they invoked interest strug-
gles of the first magnitude."3
The author might well have gone one step further and tied up the shift
from state activity to federal with the whole story of the nationalizing of
business in the late nineteenth century. This projection to the period beyond
the limits of the study itself would have caused little strain to the concluding
chapter and would have integrated the study more completely into the main





Incidentally, this is not "history for the tired business man." It is closely
written and the going is often hard. A critical bibliography, in place of the
alphabetical list of sources and authorities, would have been welcomed by this
reviewer. But these observations are somewhat picayune against the impres-
sive amount of scholarship, the sound organization of material, and the sig-
nificant interpretations which characterize the work as a whole.
ROLLIN G. OsTERwELSt
1946 ANNUAL SurVEY OF AmERICAN LAw. By New York University School
of Law. Washington Square East, New York, 1947. Pp. xciv, 1947.
DEAN, now Judge Arthur T. Vanderbilt, and his colleagues of the New York
University School of Law, have again placed the legal profession under great
obligations. The 1946 Survey of American Law, an immense book, called
upon many specialists to make up the volume. It is appropriately dedicated
to the men primarily responsible for the Reorganization Act of August 1946.
Though this is not meant as a criticism, in his preface Dean Vanderbilt might
have called attention to the fact that the Federal Tort Claims Bill, more revo-
lutionary in many respects than the other parts of the Reorganization Act,
was included.
For the most part the contributions come from the same contributors to
which we have become accustomed, but there are some new sections and some
new contributors. We would designate for special commendation the table of
cases, the statutes discussed, and the index. This is the kind of work which
requires the utmost skil and thought and rarely receives the commendation
it deserves. Like much work in this world, it appears anonymously, but
hours must have been devoted to this service. We are glad to see the restora-
tion of the discussion of Civil Remedies and Procedure by Professor Alison
Reppy. This is one of the best chapters in the book. In connection with the
use of the declaratory judgment in Colegrovc v. Grccn, the reviewer, who
was of counsel, was unaware of the fact that the Supreme Court had indi-
cated that the Declaratory Judgments Act "was not then in effect."' Atten-
tion may be called to the fact that the Illinois legislature did, as a result of
Judge Evans' criticism, redistrict the state shortly after the Supreme Court
decision. Professor Colegrove, therefore, actually may be regarded as the vic-
tor in the case, though officially he appears as a loser.
There is so much of value in this volume for the G.I. who lost several
years, as well as for the rest of the profession, that it would be stultifying to
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name any chapter as superior to any other. They all invoke court decisions,
statutes, and periodical articles. They are written in lively form, so that the
reading is facilitated. The reader may question whether the first chapter on
International Law does not contain more politics than law, but the informa-
tion given is in useful form, which is much to be appreciated. judge Vander-
bilt is to be congratulated on assembling so competent a staff. Having re-
viewed the earlier volumes, the writer is struck by the enormous amount of
work that must have gone into these volumes. If none of the contributors
ever did anything else, they will have more than justified their professional
standing by what they have already accomplished.
EDwi BoRcuDt
t Justus S. Hotchkiss Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
